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About the Project
The Liability Issues for Deep Seabed Mining 
project was developed by the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the Secretariat 
of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to 
assist in clarifying legal issues of responsibility 
and liability underpinning the development of 
exploitation regulations for the deep seabed. 
CIGI, in collaboration with the ISA Secretariat and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, in 2017, invited 
leading legal experts to form the Legal Working 
Group on Liability for Environmental Harm from 
Activities in the Area (LWG) to discuss liability 
related to environmental damage, with the goal 
of providing the Legal and Technical Commission, 
as well as members of the ISA with an in-depth 
examination of potential legal issues and avenues. 
Papers in the series cover the following topics: 
the current legal architecture for liability/
responsibility under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea; the scope of activities 
covered under a liability regime; the responsible 
parties; the potential claimants; the range of 
recoverable damages; and the appropriateness 
of using insurance and compensation funds to 
ensure adequate resources for compensation. 
CIGI Senior Fellow Neil Craik coordinated 
the development of the paper series. 
About the LWG
The LWG was co-convened by CIGI, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the Secretariat 
of the ISA, under the joint direction of Neil Craik 
(CIGI), Hannah Lily (Commonwealth Secretariat) 
and Alfonso Ascencio-Herrera (ISA Secretariat). 
Other members of the LWG were invited based on 
their expertise in areas related to international law 
of state responsibility and liability, international 
environmental law and law of the sea. While 
working under the auspices of the ISA, the LWG 
is an independent group of legal experts.
The members of the LWG are: 
• Alfonso Ascencio-Herrera, Deputy 
Secretary-General, ISA 
• Christopher Brown, Legal Officer, ISA
• Eden Charles, Independent Consultant 
on International Law, and Former Deputy 
Permanent Representative of Trinidad 
and Tobago to the United Nations*
• Neil Craik, Senior Fellow, CIGI, and 
Professor of Law, University of Waterloo*
• Tara Davenport, Research Fellow, 
Centre for International Law, National 
University of Singapore*
• Elie Jarmache, Special Adviser on 
the Law of the Sea, Member, Legal 
and Technical Commission, ISA 
• Hannah Lily, Legal Adviser, 
Commonwealth Secretariat*
• Ruth Mackenzie, Reader in International 
Law, University of Westminster*
• Stephen E. Roady, Professor of the Practice 
of Law, Duke University School of Law
• Andres Rojas, Diplomat, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Worship, Argentina*
• Dire Tladi, Professor, University of Pretoria, 
and Member, International Law Commission
• Guifang (Julia) Xue, Professor, KoGuan Law 
School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University*
*Contributing authors to the paper series.
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Executive Summary
This paper explores issues relating to defining 
environmental damage in a potential liability 
regime for deep seabed mining activities in 
the Area. The paper reviews approaches to 
environmental damage in existing liability regimes 
and processes established in international law 
in relation to other activities and areas, with a 
view to providing information and examples 
that might be useful to further consideration of 
the definition and valuation of environmental 
damage arising from deep seabed mining activities. 
It also identifies some of the considerations 
relating to mining activities in the Area that pose 
specific challenges for addressing the definition 
and valuation of environmental damage. 
Introduction
Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC)1, the 1994 Implementing 
Agreement and the regulations adopted by the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA) set out a 
regulatory regime that is, inter alia, designed 
to ensure effective protection of the marine 
environment against harmful effects that may arise 
from activities in the Area. Part XI and the ISA 
Regulations also make reference to responsibility 
and liability for damage. The Seabed Disputes 
Chamber (SDC) of the International Tribunal 
of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) provided further 
guidance on these provisions, in particular in 
relation to the responsibilities and liabilities of 
sponsoring states, in its 2011 Advisory Opinion.2 
Notwithstanding these instruments and the 
Advisory Opinion, as the ISA develops Exploitation 
Regulations with a view to the commencement 
of seabed mining activities, a number of issues 
relating to liability for any damage arising from 
those activities remain to be addressed. As part of 
the work of the Legal Working Group on Liability 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [LOSC].
2 SDC of ITLOS, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons 
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (2011), Advisory Opinion, 
No 17 [SDC Advisory Opinion 2011].
for Environmental Harm from Activities in the 
Area (LWG), and on the assumption that further 
rules and procedures on liability will need to be 
developed,3 this paper explores approaches to 
defining compensable environmental damage. This 
question is closely connected to other aspects of 
the LWG’s work (addressed in other papers in this 
series), including the scope of any liability regime.
A number of liability regimes have been established 
in international law in relation to activities that 
may give rise to damage to the environment. More 
general principles and rules relating to liability for 
environmental damage have also been considered 
in other contexts. Approaches to the definition, 
assessment and valuation of environmental 
damage taken in such instruments and processes 
may provide some models and insights for 
further discussions on liability for damage from 
activities in the Area. The principal purpose of 
this paper, therefore, is to outline and explain the 
approaches to the definition of environmental 
damage taken in these agreements and processes. 
The paper also seeks to identify, on a 
preliminary basis, some specific considerations 
and factors that may need to be considered 
in defining environmental damage in any 
liability regime to be developed in relation 
to deep seabed mining activities.
Liability and 
Compensation for 
Environmental Damage in 
International Law
This section reviews existing approaches to liability 
and compensation for environmental damage 
in international instruments and processes. In 
international agreements addressing liability 
for environmental damage, two principal 
approaches have been adopted. First, numerous 
agreements establish civil liability regimes that 
make provision for monetary compensation for 
3 Throughout this paper, for convenience, the terms “liability regime” or 
“potential liability regime” are used. This is not intended to prejudge the legal 
form or nature that any further rules and procedures on liability might take.
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covered damage. As Akiho Shibata has observed, 
in a civil liability system, “the concept of damage 
sets the parameters for monetary compensation.”4 
Some other instruments reflect an administrative 
approach to liability, in which “the concept of 
damage functions primarily as a trigger for the 
operator and the administrative organ to take 
action in relation to damage.”5 Examples of the 
definition of environmental damage in these 
two types of agreements are examined in this 
section. Then, this section briefly reviews some 
approaches to the definition and valuation 
of environmental damage in the work of the 
United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC), the International Law Commission (ILC) 
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
International Agreements 
Addressing Civil Liability for 
Environmental Damage
Several international agreements have been 
adopted that address liability for damage arising 
out of activities that pose risks to the environment. 
Most of these instruments establish rules and 
procedures relating to civil liability. To the extent 
that they address environmental damage, most 
cover only such damage occurring within national 
jurisdiction. Several instruments address activities 
posing risks in relation to the marine environment, 
including the most well-known and “active” 
regime applicable to oil pollution damage. 
Each of these international agreements sets out 
a scope and approaches tailored to the particular 
risk and/or environment that they address. They 
reflect the types of damage that might be caused 
by the activity or substances in question, and 
they reflect the degree of consensus among states 
about the nature and scope of risks posed and 
potential harm. In that sense, clearly there is 
not a single model that could be transposed and 
adopted for seabed mining activities. Nonetheless, 
these existing instruments, and any practice 
thereunder, might usefully inform discussions 
about liability for environmental damage in the 
context of activities in the Area. The fact that 
most of the instruments surveyed in this section 
4 Akiho Shibata “A new dimension in international liability regimes” in Akiho 
Shibata, ed, International Liability Regime for Biodiversity Damage: The 
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol (New York: Routledge, 2014) 
at 36.
5 Ibid.
adopt a civil liability approach is not intended to 
prejudge the nature of any rules and procedures 
on liability that might be adopted in respect of 
damage arising from activities in the Area.
The instruments surveyed here address liability for 
damage relating to oil pollution;6 nuclear energy;7 
carriage of hazardous and noxious substances 
(HNS) at sea;8 bunker oil pollution;9 hazardous 
wastes;10 industrial accidents on transboundary 
waters;11 and, more generally, activities dangerous 
to the environment.12 This list gives a sense of 
the diversity of instruments. The fact that several 
of these instruments have so far failed to enter 
into force serves to highlight the challenge of 
establishing widely accepted international rules 
governing liability and compensation for damage. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the instruments 
surveyed here often cover traditional heads 
of damage, such as damage to property. For 
example, the 1992 International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 CLC) 
6 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,  
27 November 1992, IMO LEG/CONF.9.15 (entered into force 30 May 
1996) [1992 CLC]; International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 27 November 
1992, IMO LEG.CONF.9/16 (entered into force 30 May 1996) [1992 Fund 
Convention]; Protocol of 2003 to the 1992 Fund Convention, 16 May 2003, 
IMO LEG/CONF.14/DC/2 (entered into force 3 March 2005) (together, the 
1992 Fund and the Supplementary Fund are referred to as the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation [IOPC] Funds).
7 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 29 July 
1960, 956 UNTS 251 (entered into force 1 April 1968) (amended by 1964 
and 1982 Protocols [1960 Paris Convention] and amended by 2004 Protocol, 
12 February 2004, [not in force] [2004 Nuclear Liability Protocol]) (see 
Nuclear Energy Agency, “2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention”, 
online: <www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-protocol.html>; Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 21 May 1963, 1063 UNTS 
265 (entered into force 12 November 1977) (amended by 1997 Protocol, 
36 ILM 1462) [1963 Vienna Convention]; Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 12 September 1997, 36 ILM 1473 
(entered into force 15 April 2015).
8 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances at Sea, 
3 May 1996, 25 ILM 1406 (not in force) and 2010 Protocol [1996 HNS 
Convention].
9 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
27 March 2001, IMO LEG/CONF.12/19 (entered into force 21 November 
2008) [2001 Bunker Convention].
10 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,  
9 December 1999, UNTS 120 (2005) (not in force) [Basel Liability Protocol].
11 Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters,  
21 May 2003, ECE/MP.WAT/11-ECE/CP.TEIA/9 (not in force).
12 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 21 June 1993, 32 ILM 1228 (not in 
force) [Lugano Convention].
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defines “pollution damage” as including “loss or 
damage caused outside the ship by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from 
the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may 
occur.”13 Pollution damage also includes the costs 
of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures (discussed further 
below in relation to environmental damage). The 
1996 International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
at Sea (HNS Convention) includes within its 
definition of damage, loss of life or personal injury 
on board or outside a ship carrying HNS caused 
by those substances, as well as loss of or damage 
to property outside a ship carrying HNS caused by 
those substances.14 Such examples and approaches 
may be relevant in addressing damage to persons 
and property arising out of activities in the Area, 
but, in light of the focus on environmental harm 
here, they are not addressed further in this paper.
For the purposes of this paper, the key feature of 
these agreements is the definition of damage that 
they adopt as it relates to the environment and any 
practice under the agreements relating to claims for 
such damage. The definition, and compensability, 
of damage to the environment varies under the 
agreements.15  Some early instruments contain no 
specific reference to damage to the environment. 
Commonly accepted formulations include 
within the definition of compensable damage: 
 → loss of profit arising from impairment 
to the environment; 
 → reasonable measures of reinstatement 
of the environment undertaken 
or to be undertaken; and 
 → reasonable preventive measures. 
13 1992 CLC, supra note 6, art 1(6)(a).
14 1996 HNS Convention, supra note 8, art 1(6)(a), (b).
15 See generally Louise de La Fayette, “The Concept of Environmental Damage 
in International Liability Regimes” in Michael Bowman & Alan Boyle, eds, 
Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law: Problems 
of Definition and Valuation (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
149–89; Edward HP Brans, Liability for Damage to Public Natural Resources: 
Standing, Damage and Damage Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001).
As discussed below, several instruments 
also include the introduction of equivalent 
components of the environment where 
reinstatement is not possible.
The civil liability regime established for oil 
pollution damage covers “impairment of the 
environment” within the definition of “pollution 
damage.” However, other than loss of profit from 
such impairment, this is limited to “the costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually 
undertaken or to be undertaken.”16 As noted above, 
“preventive measures” are also covered, defined as 
“any reasonable measures taken by any person after 
an incident has occurred to prevent and minimize 
pollution damage.”17 Similar approaches to the 
definition of compensable environmental damage 
are taken, for example, in the 2001 Convention on 
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,18 and 
the 1996 HNS Convention and its 2010 Protocol.19
While some national courts have taken a different 
approach,20 the IOPC Fund has maintained that 
compensation for impairment to the environment 
is limited to the measures listed above. The IOPC 
Fund’s 2016 annual report notes that, in addition 
to property damage, admissible claims include 
economic losses by the fishing industry or those 
engaged in mariculture and economic losses in the 
tourism sector, i.e., loss of profit from impairment 
of the environment. Claims also include costs 
of clean-up operations at sea and on shore, and 
costs of reinstatement of the environment. In 
particular, in the oil pollution regime, there has 
been a resistance to the idea of compensating 
“pure” environmental damage (or pure ecological 
loss), i.e., non-economic values associated with 
environmental damage.21 Such damage would 
require different means of assessment and 
valuation, including potentially theoretical models 
of valuation. In 1980, Fund Assembly Resolution 
No. 3 stated that assessment of compensation by 
the (1971) Fund would not be made on the basis of 
an abstract quantification of damage calculated in 
16 1992 CLC, supra note 6, art 1(6)(a).
17 Ibid, arts 1(6)(b), (7).
18 2001 Bunker Convention, supra note 9, art 1(9).
19 1996 HNS Convention, supra note 8, arts 1(6)(c), (d).
20 See Philippe Sands & Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 4th ed (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2018) at 784–88.
21 Ibid at 750. 
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accordance with theoretical models.22 This position 
has been maintained, most recently in guidelines 
for presenting claims for environmental damage 
published by the IOPC Funds in 2018.23 These 
guidelines address claims for costs of post-incident 
studies and reinstatement measures. The guidelines 
discuss, inter alia, specific criteria for reinstatement 
measures, which focus on accelerating and 
enhancing the recovery of the damaged component 
of the environment and establish that the costs of 
reinstatement must be proportionate to the extent 
and duration of the damage and the benefits likely 
to be achieved.24 Measures taken at some distance 
from the damaged area, but still within the general 
vicinity, may be acceptable as long as it can be 
demonstrated that they would actually enhance 
the recovery of the damaged components of the 
environment and the services those components 
provide.25 However, replacing a damaged site 
by “creating” an equivalent resource elsewhere 
may not satisfy the criteria.26 The guidelines 
acknowledge that there is little experience of 
admissible claims for reinstatement measures.27
The original 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage did not cover environmental damage. 
However, the Vienna Convention did envisage 
that loss or damage not explicitly included in the 
definition of nuclear damage in the convention 
could be covered if and to the extent that the law 
of the competent court allowed.28 The 2004 Protocol 
to Amend the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy would add 
to the definition of nuclear damage impairment 
of the environment in terms similar to that of the 
1992 CLC. The costs of measures of reinstatement 
of the impaired environment are included, unless 
22 IOPC Funds, Resolutions of the 1971 Fund, Resolution No 3 – Pollution 
Damage (October 1980) at 5, online: <https://documentservices.iopcfunds.
org/fileadmin/IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/RES_71_e.pdf>.
23 IOPC Funds, Guidelines for presenting claims for environmental damage, 
2018 ed (London, UK: IOPC Funds, 2018), online: <www.iopcfunds.
org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/IOPC_Environmental_Guidelines_
ENGLISH_2018_WEB_01.pdf>.
24 Ibid at para 4.3.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid at para 5.22.
27 Ibid at para 5.11.
28 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art I.1(k)(ii); Sands & Peel, supra note 
20 at 776.
such impairment is “insignificant.”29 “Measures 
of reinstatement” are defined as “any reasonable 
measures which have been approved by the 
competent authorities of the State where the 
measures were taken, and which aim to reinstate 
or restore damaged or destroyed components of the 
environment, or to introduce, where reasonable, 
the equivalent of these components into the 
environment. The legislation of the State where 
the nuclear damage is suffered shall determine 
who is entitled to take such measures.”30 Thus, 
the Protocol envisages not only reinstatement or 
restoration but also potentially the introduction of 
equivalent components of the environment. The 
Protocol also defined “reasonable measures” as 
measures which are found under the law 
of the competent court to be appropriate 
and proportionate, having regard to 
all the circumstances, for example:
1) the nature and extent of the nuclear 
damage incurred or, in the case of 
preventive measures, the nature and 
extent of the risk of such damage; 
2) the extent to which, at the time 
they are taken, such measures 
are likely to be effective; and 
3) relevant scientific and technical expertise.31
A Protocol to the 1963 Vienna Convention, adopted 
in 1997, provided an expanded definition of 
nuclear damage in the same terms of the 2004 
Protocol to the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, 
the convention, as amended by the Protocol, 
would still not require environmental damage 
to be compensated, except to the extent 
determined by the law of the competent court.32
In the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability 
for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous 
to the Environment, while the basic definition of 
environmental damage is similar to that in the 1992 
CLC, loss of income deriving from a direct economic 
interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment 
is only recoverable if incurred as a result of a 
29 2004 Nuclear Liability Protocol, supra note 7, art I.B, amending article 1(a) 
of the 1960 Paris Agreement.  
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, supra note 7, art 2(2).
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significant impairment of that environment. 
“Measures of reinstatement” are defined as            
“[a]ny reasonable measures aiming to reinstate 
or restore damaged or destroyed components 
of the environment or to introduce, where 
reasonable, the equivalent of these components 
into the environment. Internal law may indicate 
who will be entitled to take such measures.”33
Thus, the Lugano Convention specifically 
envisaged the possibility of introduction of 
equivalent components of the environment, 
potentially in situations in which reinstatement 
or restoration was not possible.34 It also raised 
the question of who might be entitled to take 
such measures, leaving this matter to domestic 
law to resolve. Moreover, article 2(10) of the 
Lugano Convention provided a broad definition 
of “environment” for these purposes to include:
 → natural resources both biotic and abiotic, 
such as air, water, soil fauna and flora and 
the interaction between the same factors;
 → property which forms part of 
the cultural heritage; and
 → the characteristic aspects of the landscape.
While this convention is regional in scope and 
did not attract sufficient ratifications to enter 
into force, it represents a more comprehensive 
attempt to define and provide for compensation 
for potential environmental harm, both in terms 
of the definition of environment and the measures 
for which compensation may be recoverable. 
The 1999 Basel Liability Protocol, addressing 
damage from the transboundary movement 
of hazardous wastes and their disposal, covers 
environmental damage along the same lines 
as the 1992 CLC, but also includes within its 
definition of measures of reinstatement “any 
reasonable measures aiming to assess, reinstate 
or restore damaged or destroyed components 
of the environment. Domestic law may indicate 
who will be entitled to take such measures.” Thus, 
costs of reasonable measures to assess damaged 
33 Lugano Convention, supra note 12, art 2(8).
34 The approach in the Lugano Convention is also reflected in the 2003 
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters, 
supra note 11.
or destroyed components of the environment are 
also specifically recoverable in this instance.35
Guidelines on liability adopted under the 
Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of 
the Mediterranean36 include within the scope 
of compensation for environmental damage 
“diminution in value of natural or biological 
resources pending restoration” and “compensation 
by equivalent if the impaired environment cannot 
return to its previous condition.”37 The guidelines 
note that where compensation is granted for 
these types of damage, it should be earmarked 
for intervention in the environmental field in 
the Mediterranean Sea area.38 The guidelines 
are also to apply to damage caused by pollution 
of a diffuse character, provided it is possible 
to establish a causal link between the damage 
and activities of individual operators.39
Other Agreements 
Addressing Liability for 
Environmental Damage
A few agreements have been adopted that 
reflect an administrative approach to liability 
for environmental damage, focusing primarily 
on response and restoration measures.
The 2010 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary 
Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety40 
addresses damage to biodiversity in a field in 
which regulation is intended to be guided by the 
35 See also discussion of the practice of the UNCC below.
36 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal 
Region of the Mediterranean, 16 February 1976, 15 ILM 290 (entered into 
force 1 February 1979), as amended June 1995, UNEP(OCA)/MED IG.6/7 
(entered into force 9 July 2004) [Barcelona Convention].
37 Barcelona Convention, Decision IG 17/4 Guidelines for the Determination 
of Liability and Compensation resulting from Pollution of the Marine 
Environment of the Mediterranean Sea Area, UNEP(DEPI)MED IG.17/10 
(2008), Annex V at paras 10(d), (e). Paragraph 10 also covers the types 
of environmental damage discussed above in relation to other agreements: 
activities and studies to assess damage; costs of preventive measures; and 
costs of measures taken or to be undertaken to clean up, restore and reinstate 
the impaired environment.
38 Ibid at para 13.
39 Ibid at para 15.
40 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 15 October 2010, 50 ILM 108 
(entered into force 5 March 2018) [Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol]. See 
Akiho Shibata, ed, International Liability Regime for Biodiversity Damage: 
the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol (New York: Routledge, 
2014).
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precautionary approach. The Protocol applies to 
damage resulting from living (genetically) modified 
organisms that have been subject to transboundary 
movement. In the Protocol, “damage” is defined as: 
an adverse effect on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account 
risks to human health, that:
i) is measurable or otherwise observable 
taking into account, wherever 
available, scientifically-established 
baselines recognized by a competent 
authority that takes into account 
any other human induced variation 
and natural variation; and
ii) is significant.41
A “significant” adverse effect for the purpose of the 
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol is 
to be determined on the basis of factors, such as:
a) The long-term or permanent change, to 
be understood as change that will not 
be redressed through natural recovery 
within a reasonable period of time;
b) The extent of the qualitative or 
quantitative changes that adversely affect 
the components of biological diversity;
c) The reduction of the ability of 
components of biological diversity 
to provide goods and services;
d) The extent of any adverse effects on human 
health in the context of the Protocol.42
Thus, the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol defines 
damage by reference to significant adverse effects 
and refers to scientifically established baselines 
in relation to the measurement of adverse effects. 
The Protocol takes an administrative approach, 
addressing response measures in the event of 
damage or where relevant information indicates 
that there is a sufficient likelihood that damage will 
result if timely response measures are not taken.43 
Under the Protocol, parties are to require the 
41 Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol, supra note 40, art 2(2)(b).
42 Ibid, art 2(3).
43 Ibid, arts 5(1), (3). For a similar approach, see Annex VI to the 1991 Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, discussed below.
operator(s), in the event of damage, to inform the 
competent authority, evaluate the damage and take 
appropriate response measures.44 The competent 
authority is to identify the operator that caused the 
damage, evaluate the damage and determine which 
response measures should be taken by the operator. 
If the operator fails to act, the competent authority 
may implement appropriate response measures and 
has the right to recover costs from the operator.45 
“Response measures” may also be required in 
order to avoid damage.46 Response measures are 
defined in the Protocol as reasonable actions to:
i) Prevent, minimise, contain, mitigate, or 
otherwise avoid damage, as appropriate;
ii) Restore biological diversity through 
actions to be undertaken in the 
following order of preference:
a. Restoration of biological diversity to the 
condition that existed before the damage 
occurred, or its nearest equivalent; 
and where the competent authority 
determines this is not possible;
b. Restoration by, inter alia, replacing the 
loss of biological diversity with other 
components of biological diversity 
for the same, or another type of use 
either at the same or, as appropriate, 
at an alternative location.47
Thus, in relation to response measures, the 
Protocol acknowledges that restoration may not 
be possible and provides the alternative of the 
replacement of “lost” or damaged biodiversity 
with an equivalent or replacing the “use” of the 
affected biodiversity in situ or at another location. 
Two agreements have been adopted relevant 
to Antarctic mining activities, environmental 
protection and liability. The 1988 Convention on 
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Activities (CRAMRA)48 has not entered into force. 
However, it may be of particular interest in 
discussions concerning liability for environmental 
44 Ibid, art 5(1).
45 Ibid, arts 5(4), (5).
46 Ibid, art 5(3).
47 Ibid, art 2(2)(d).
48 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 2 June 
1988, 27 ILM 868 (not in force) [1988 CRAMRA].
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harm from activities in the Area as it envisaged 
a relationship between sponsoring states 
and operators in relation to mineral resource 
exploitation in Antarctica, and it addressed 
mining activities in an area beyond national 
jurisdiction,49 to which the principle of “common 
heritage of mankind” (CHM) has relevance.50 
Article 1(15) of CRAMRA provides: “Damage to the 
Antarctic environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems means any impact on the living or 
non-living components of that environment or 
those ecosystems, including harm to atmospheric, 
marine or terrestrial life, beyond that which is 
negligible or which has been assessed and judged 
to be acceptable pursuant to this Convention.”
This definition addresses both living and non-living 
components of the environment or ecosystems. 
The reference to damage “which has been assessed 
and judged to be acceptable pursuant to this 
Convention” appears to relate the regulatory 
objective to protect and preserve the Antarctic 
environment and to allow mineral resource 
activities only where it is judged, based upon 
assessment of possible impacts on the Antarctic 
environment and on dependent and associated 
ecosystems, that the activity in question would 
not cause significant adverse effects.51 It is not 
linked to specific criteria or indicators that might 
define and revise acceptable levels of damage, 
and as the convention has not entered into force, 
it cannot be expected that this definition will be 
further elaborated in practice. Article 8 of CRAMRA 
establishes certain rules and procedures for 
response action and liability. Under this provision, 
operators undertaking any Antarctic mineral 
resource activity would have to take necessary 
and timely response action if that activity 
results in or threatens to result in damage to the 
Antarctic environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems. Under article 8(2), an operator would 
be strictly liable for, inter alia, “damage to the 
Antarctic environment or dependent or associated 
ecosystems arising from Antarctic mineral resource 
activities, including payment in the event that there 
has been no restoration to the status quo ante.”52
49 Notwithstanding sovereignty claims “suspended” under article IV of the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty.
50 See e.g. Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic 
Regime and the Environmental Protocol (Columbia, South Carolina: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1998) at 220–58.
51 1988 CRAMRA, supra note 48, art 4(2).
52 Ibid, art 8(2) [emphasis added].
CRAMRA has been replaced, in effect, by the 1991 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty,53 which prohibits mineral resource 
activities, other than scientific research.54 In 
accordance with article 16 of the Protocol, in 2005, 
the parties adopted Annex VI,55 which establishes 
a pared-back (compared to CRAMRA) liability 
regime applicable to environmental emergencies56 
that relate to scientific research programs, tourism 
and all other governmental and non-governmental 
activities in the Antarctic Treaty area for which 
advance notice is required under article VII(5) 
of the Antarctic Treaty in the Antarctic Treaty 
area. Each party must require its operators to 
undertake reasonable preventive measures that 
are designed to reduce the risk of environmental 
emergencies and their potential adverse impact,57 
and to take prompt and effective response action 
to environmental emergencies arising from the 
activities of that operator.58 “Reasonable,” in relation 
to “preventative” measures and response action, 
means “measures or actions which are appropriate, 
practicable, proportionate and based on the 
availability of objective criteria and information, 
including: (i) risks to the Antarctic environment, 
and the rate of its natural recovery; (ii) risks to 
human life and safety; and (iii) technological and 
economic feasibility.” “Response action” means 
“reasonable measures taken after an environmental 
emergency has occurred to avoid, minimise 
or contain the impact of that environmental 
emergency, which to that end may include clean-
up in appropriate circumstances, and includes 
determining the extent of that emergency and its 
impact.”59 Where an operator does not take prompt 
and effective response action, then the (state) party 
of that operator and other parties are encouraged 
53 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 4 October 1991, 
30 ILM 1461 (in force 14 January 1998) [Antarctic Environment Protocol].
54 Ibid, art 7; see also article 25(5) with respect to possible modification or 
amendment of article 7.
55 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Final Report of the Twenty-Eighth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (Buenos Aires: Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, 2005) at 61. 
Annex VI is not yet in force. 
56 These are defined as “any accidental event that has occurred, having taken 
place after the entry into force of this Annex, and that results in, or imminently 
threatens to result in, any significant and harmful impact on the Antarctic 
environment” (ibid, Annex VI, art 2[b]).
57 Ibid, art 3(1).
58 Ibid, art 5(1).
59 Ibid, arts 2(e), (f).
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to take such action,60 and in such circumstances, 
the operator shall be liable to pay the costs of such 
a response action. Where prompt and effective 
response action is not taken, and no response 
action is taken by any party, article 6 makes 
provisions for payments to a fund established under 
article 12 of the Annex. The provisions on response 
measures in Annex VI seem limited in that they 
do not explicitly consider or address restoration.
Liability for Environmental 
Damage in the Work of Other 
International Institutions
Beyond the context of multilateral treaties, other 
bodies have addressed aspects of liability for 
environmental damage, including the definition 
and valuation of compensable damage.  
The UNCC was established to deal with damage 
claims arising out of Iraq’s invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait in 1990. In establishing the UNCC, the 
UN Security Council had already determined that 
Iraq “was liable under international law for any 
direct loss, damage, including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources…as 
a result of [its] unlawful invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.”61 Thus, the context of the establishment 
and operation of the UNCC was evidently quite 
different from the development of a regime to 
govern liability arising out of activities in the 
Area. Essentially, the purpose of the UNCC was 
to administer verifiable claims. Nonetheless, 
it was recognized that addressing claims for 
environmental damage and depletion of natural 
resources would pose special challenges. In this 
context, the UNCC had to develop criteria and 
methods to address such claims, and it received 
numerous claims under this head of damage.62 As 
a first step, the UNCC Governing Council decided 
that compensation in respect of environmental 
damage or depletion of natural resources would 
include losses and expenses arising from:
a) Abatement and prevention of 
environmental damage...;
60 Ibid, arts 5(2)–(5).
61 UN Security Council, Resolution 687 Iraq-Kuwait, UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991) 
at para 16.
62 On environmental and natural resources claims in the UNCC, see Michael T 
Huguenin et al, “Assessment and Valuation of Damage to the Environment” 
in Cymie Payne & Peter Sand, eds, Gulf War Reparations and the UN 
Compensation Commission: Environmental Claims (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 67–94.
b) Reasonable measures already taken 
to clean and restore the environment 
or future measures which can be 
documented as reasonably necessary 
to clean and restore the environment;
c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment 
of the environmental damage for the 
purpose of evaluating and abating the 
harm and restoring the environment;
d) Reasonable monitoring of public health 
and performing medical screenings 
for the purposes of investigating and 
combating increased health risks as a 
result of the environmental damage; and 
e) Depletion of or damage to 
natural resources.63
A panel of UNCC commissioners then examined 
and assessed the claims. The panel dealing with 
environmental damage and depletion of natural 
resources claims found that the criteria established 
by the Governing Council were not exhaustive,64 
and that the term “environmental damage” 
was not limited to damage to natural resources 
with a commercial value.65 It also took the view 
that where loss or damage to the environment 
was temporary, this did not affect the question 
of compensability, although it might affect the 
nature and quantum of compensation deemed 
appropriate.66 The panel found that there was 
“no justification for the contention that general 
international law precludes compensation for 
pure environmental damage.”67 It decided that 
where a resource had a commercial value and 
was damaged for a period of time, compensation 
should be awarded on the basis of the market price 
63 UNCC, Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, Governing Council Dec 
7, UN Doc S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1 (1992) at para 35 [UNCC, Criteria]. The 
Governing Council decision did not address valuation of compensation for 
such damage.
64 UNCC, Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners 
concerning the Second Instalment of “F4” Claims, UN Doc S/
AC.26/2002/26 (2002) at paras 22–23.
65 UNCC, Report on the Fifth Instalment of “F4” Claims, UN Doc S/
AC.26/2005/10 (2005) at para 55 [UNCC, Report on the Fifth Instalment].
66 Ibid at para 56.
67 Ibid at para 58. The panel added that “[i]n particular, the Panel does not 
consider that the exclusion of compensation for pure environmental damage 
in some international conventions on civil liability and compensation is a valid 
basis for asserting that international law, in general, prohibits compensation 
for such damage in all cases, even where the damage results from an 
internationally wrongful act” [footnote omitted]. 
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for the period of time that the damage persisted, 
adjusted as appropriate to take into account the 
influence of other sources of damage.68 For damage 
to resources that did not have a market reference 
price, the UNCC panel indicated that it would be 
willing to compensate natural resource losses 
by reference to the costs of other environmental 
projects that were put in place to compensate 
for the loss of ecological services that the natural 
resources would have provided had they not been 
damaged, so long as there was “sufficient evidence 
that primary restoration will not fully compensate 
for any identified losses.”69 Thus, the emphasis 
was on primary remediation and restoration of 
services, but there appears to have been recognition 
that compensation for other restoration activities 
would be available where primary restoration 
was not possible or where there were interim 
losses.70 Some claimants used “habitat equivalency 
analysis” (HEA) to determine the amount of 
compensation claimed, which involves assessing 
the nature and extent of the temporary loss of 
ecological services from the damaged resources, 
determining the gain in ecological services 
anticipated from the compensatory projects and 
calculating the cost of the compensatory projects. 
In considering approaches to valuation of damage, 
the panel expressed the view that “international 
law does not prescribe any specific and exclusive 
methods of measurement for awards of damages 
for internationally wrongful acts by states. The 
general rule is to restore what has been damaged 
to integrity or, if this is not possible, to provide 
an equivalent for it.”71 The panel recognized that:
there are inherent difficulties in 
attempting to place a monetary value on 
damaged natural resources, particularly 
resources that are not traded in the 
market. With specific regard to HEA, the 
Panel recognizes that it is a relatively 
novel methodology, and that it has had 
limited application at the national and 
international levels. The Panel is also 
aware that there are uncertainties in HEA 
calculations, especially for establishing 
a metric that appropriately accounts 
for different types of service losses and 
68 Ibid at paras 103–18.
69 Ibid at para 82.
70 José R Allen, “Points of Law” in Payne & Sand, supra note 62 at 167.
71 UNCC, Report on the Fifth Instalment, supra note 65 at para 80.
for determining the nature and scale of 
compensatory restoration measures that 
are appropriate for damage to particular 
resources. For these reasons, the Panel 
considers that claims presented on the 
basis of HEA or similar methodologies of 
resource valuation should be accepted only 
after the Panel has satisfied itself that the 
extent of damage and the quantification 
of compensation claimed are appropriate 
and reasonable in the circumstances of 
each claim. However, the Panel does not 
consider that these potential difficulties 
are a sufficient reason for a wholesale 
rejection of these methodologies, or for 
concluding that their use is contrary 
to international law principles.72
In addressing compensation claims in respect 
of “reasonable monitoring and assessment 
of environmental damage for the purpose of 
evaluating and abating the harm and restoring 
the environment,”73 the UNCC found that 
environmental monitoring and assessment 
were justified even where it was not yet firmly 
established that environmental damage had 
occurred. Conclusive proof of environmental 
damage was not a prerequisite for a monitoring 
and assessment activity to be compensable.74 
However, the panel did not award compensation 
for monitoring and assessment activities that 
were “purely theoretical and speculative.”75
While the work of the UNCC addressed 
damage arising out of the wrongful act 
of a state, its approach to the definition 
and valuation of environmental damage 
may have wider significance.
The ILC has also opined on compensation for 
environmental damage in its work on the allocation 
of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising 
out of hazardous activities. The ILC has identified 
as elements of “damage”: “loss or damage by 
impairment of the environment”; “the costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement of...the 
environment, including natural resources”; and 
72 Ibid at para 81.
73 UNCC, Criteria, supra note 63 at para 35(c). 
74 UNCC, Report of the First Instalment of “F4” Claims, S/AC.26/2001/16 
(2001) at paras 29–30.
75 Ibid at para 31.
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“the costs of reasonable response measures.”76 
These appear to reflect the approach taken in 
several of the civil liability instruments surveyed 
above. Principle 3(b) of the Draft Principles on 
the Allocation of Loss provides that the purpose 
of the draft principles include “to preserve 
and protect the environment in the event of 
transboundary damage, especially with respect to 
mitigation of damage to the environment and its 
restoration or reinstatement.” In the Commentary, 
the ILC notes that Draft Principle 3(b) gives:
a prominent place to the protection and 
preservation of the environment and to 
the associated obligations to mitigate 
the damage and to restore or reinstate 
the same to its original condition to the 
extent possible. Thus it emphasizes the 
more recent concern of the international 
community to recognize protection of 
the environment per se as a value by 
itself without having to be seen only 
in the context of damage to persons 
and property. It reflects the policy to 
preserve the environment as a valuable 
resource not only for the benefit of the 
present generation but also for future 
generations. In view of its novelty and 
the common interest in its protection, 
it is important to emphasize that 
damage to the environment per se could 
constitute damage subject to prompt 
and adequate compensation, which 
includes reimbursement of reasonable 
costs of response and restoration and 
remediation measures undertaken.77 
Draft Principle 2 defines “damage” 
in the following terms:
“damage” means significant damage 
caused to persons, property or the 
environment; and includes: 
i) loss of life or personal injury; 
76 ILC, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, YB ILC, vol 
2, Part 2 (2006) [ILC, Draft Principles]; UN General Assembly, Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly on 4 December 2006: Allocation of loss in 
the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities, GA Res 
61/36, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/36 (2006).
77 ILC, Draft Principles, supra note 76, Commentary at para 6.
ii) loss of, or damage to, property, 
including property which forms 
part of the cultural heritage; 
iii) loss or damage by impairment 
of the environment; 
iv) the costs of reasonable measures 
of reinstatement of the property, or 
environment, including natural resources; 
v) the costs of reasonable response measures. 
“Environment” for the purpose of the Draft 
Articles includes natural resources, both abiotic 
and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora 
and the interaction between these factors, and 
the characteristic aspects of the landscape.
In its Commentary to Draft Principle 
2, the ILC observed that:
Recent trends are also encouraging in 
allowing compensation for loss of “non-
use value” of the environment. There 
is some support for this claim from the 
[International Law] Commission itself 
when it adopted its draft articles on 
State responsibility, even though it is 
admitted that such damage is difficult 
to quantify. The recent decisions of 
the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) in opting for a broad 
interpretation of the term “environmental 
damage” is a pointer of developments 
to come. In the case of F-4 category of 
environmental and public health claims, 
the F-4 Panel of the UNCC allowed claims 
for compensation for damage to natural 
resources without commercial value 
(so-called “pure” environmental damage) 
and also claims where there was only a 
temporary loss of resource use during 
the period prior to full restoration.78
In its work on state responsibility, the ILC has 
commented that “environmental damage will 
often extend beyond that which can be readily 
quantified in terms of clean-up costs or property 
devaluation. Damage to such environmental values 
(biodiversity, amenity, etc.—sometimes referred 
to as “non-use values”) is, as a matter of principle, 
78 Ibid at para 18 [footnotes omitted]. 
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no less real and compensable than damage to 
property, though it may be difficult to quantify.”79
In 2018, the ICJ addressed compensation for 
environmental damage in a case concerning 
damage to wetlands. The ICJ affirmed that “it is 
consistent with the principles of international law 
governing the consequences of internationally 
wrongful acts, including the principle of full 
reparation, to hold that compensation is due for 
damage caused to the environment in and of itself, 
in addition to expenses incurred by an injured 
state as a consequence of such damage.”80 In this 
case, the ICJ took the view that “damage to the 
environment, and the consequent impairment or 
loss of the ability of the environment to provide 
goods and services, is compensable under 
international law” and that “[s]uch compensation 
may include indemnification for the impairment 
or loss of environmental goods and services in 
the period prior to recovery and payment for the 
restoration of the damaged environment.”81 The 
court acknowledged that issues may arise as to 
the existence of damage and causation in cases 
of alleged environmental damage. The court also 
noted in respect of valuation of such damage that 
the absence of adequate evidence as to the extent 
of material damage would not, in all situations, 
preclude an award of compensation for that 
damage.82 The ICJ observed that international 
law does not prescribe any specific method of 
valuation for the purposes of compensation for 
environmental damage and that it was necessary 
to take into account the specific circumstances 
and characteristics of each case.83 In the face of 
competing valuation methodologies put forward 
by the parties, the court’s approach to the 
determination of compensation of environmental 
damage in this case was to assess the value to 
be assigned to the restoration of the damaged 
environment as well as to the impairment or loss 
of environmental goods and services prior to 
79 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with Commentaries, YB ILC, vol 2, Part 2 (2001), Commentary to art 36 
at para 15.
80 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica 
v Nicaragua) Compensation owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the 
Republic of Costa Rica (2018), at para 41.
81 Ibid at para 42.
82 Ibid at paras 34–35; see also para 86.
83 Ibid at para 52.
recovery.84 Further, in the circumstances of the case, 
the court considered it appropriate to approach 
the valuation of environmental damage from 
the perspective of the ecosystem as a whole by 
adopting an overall assessment of the impairment 
of loss of environmental goods and services 
prior to recovery, rather than attributing values 
to specific categories of environmental goods 
and services and estimating recovery periods for 
each of them.85 In an earlier case not involving 
environmental damage, the court observed 
that quantification of compensation for non-
material injury rests on equitable considerations 
and awarded compensation on this basis.86 
The wide range of instruments and processes 
surveyed above demonstrate a variety of 
approaches to questions of the definition and 
valuation of environmental harm. Nonetheless, 
they appear to suggest growing recognition of 
the need to provide for forms of compensation 
for loss of environmental resources and services, 
including through restoration, and other measures 
such as the introduction of equivalent resources 
where primary restoration is not possible or 
results in interim losses. Different contexts 
give rise to different challenges in relation 
to assessing and implementing appropriate 
restoration and compensatory measures.  
Deep Seabed Mining and 
Environmental Damage
If a liability regime is developed for environmental 
harm arising from activities in the Area, a 
number of issues arise relating to the features 
and legal character of the Area, its resources 
and the marine environment of the Area, as 
well as the relation of any liability regime to 
the rules and approaches in the convention, 
the 1994 Agreement and ISA Regulations. This 
section attempts a preliminary identification 
and consideration of some of these issues. 
84 Ibid at para 53
85 Ibid at para 78.
86 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo) 
(2012), compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of Congo to the 
Republic of Guinea, at para 24.
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The Legal Framework: The 
LOSC and Related Instruments 
The provisions of Part XII of the LOSC impose 
obligations on parties to protect and preserve 
the marine environment.87 Part XI of the LOSC 
addresses protection of the marine environment 
from harmful effects that may arise from activities 
in the Area. Article 145 provides that necessary 
measures shall be taken in accordance with the 
convention with respect to activities in the Area 
to ensure effective protection for the marine 
environment from harmful effects that may arise 
from such activities. The ISA is to adopt appropriate 
rules, regulations and procedures to this end. 
Article 162(2)(x) provides that the Council shall 
“disapprove areas for exploitation by contractors or 
the Enterprise in cases where substantial evidence 
indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine 
environment.” Article 162(2)(w) also requires the 
Council to issue emergency orders, which may 
include orders for the suspension or adjustment of 
operations, to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment arising out of activities in the Area. 
Article 165(2)(k) and (l) impose corresponding 
obligations on the Legal and Technical Commission 
to make recommendations to the Council in this 
regard. The ISA has taken up the requirement 
to establish international rules, regulations and 
procedures in the Mining Code, including the three 
sets of Exploration Regulations,88 and the ongoing 
process to develop Exploitation Regulations.89  
While the emphasis is on protection of the marine 
environment from harmful effects arising from 
activities in the Area, Part XI and Annex III also 
address responsibility and liability for damage in 
relation to such activities. Article 139(2) provides 
that damage caused by the failure of a state party 
or international organization to carry out its 
responsibilities under Part XI shall entail liability. 
However, it specifies that a state party shall not 
be liable for damage caused by any failure to 
comply with Part XI by a person whom it has 
sponsored under article 153(2)(b) if the state 
87 See in particular arts 192, 194, 209.
88 ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules 
in the Area, updated and amended, ISBA/19/C/17 (2013) [Nodules 
Regulations]; ISA, Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area, ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (2010); ISA, 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese 
Crusts in the Area, ISBA/18/A/11 (2012).
89 ISA, Draft Regulations on Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area, 
ISBA/24/LTC/WP.1/Rev.1 (2018) [Draft Exploitation Regulations].
party has taken all necessary and appropriate 
measures to secure effective compliance. Article 
22 of Annex III provides that “the contractor shall 
have responsibility or liability for any damage 
arising out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its 
operations, account being taken of contributory 
acts or omissions of the Authority. Similarly, the 
Authority shall have responsibility or liability for 
any damage arising out of wrongful acts in the 
exercise of its powers and functions…account 
being taken of contributory acts or omissions 
by the contractor. Liability in every case shall 
be for the actual amount of damage.”90
Annex III and Part XI do not further elucidate 
responsibility and/or liability of the ISA, states 
parties, sponsoring states or contractors. Neither 
do they clarify what types of damage might 
arise and how the “actual amount of damage” 
might be defined or quantified. Aspects of 
responsibility and liability have also been addressed 
in the Exploration Regulations, including the 
standard clauses for exploration contracts.91
The SDC clarified some aspects of the liability 
issues raised in Part XI and Annex III in its 2011 
Advisory Opinion.92 In considering article 139(2), the 
SDC noted that “[n]either the Convention nor the 
relevant Regulations (regulation 30 of the Nodules 
Regulations and regulation 32 of the Sulphides 
Regulations) specifies what constitutes compensable 
damage, or which subjects may be entitled to claim 
compensation. It may be envisaged that the damage 
in question would include damage to the Area and 
its resources constituting the common heritage of 
mankind, and damage to the marine environment.”93
The SDC also addressed the amount and form of 
compensation, by reference to Annex III, article 22. 
Here, the SDC was of the view that the provisions 
concerning liability of the contractor for the actual 
amount of damage under Annex III, article 22, were 
equally valid with regard to the liability of the 
sponsoring state.94 The SDC suggested that “the form 
of reparation will depend on both the actual damage 
and the technical feasibility of restoring the situation 
90 LOSC, supra note 1, Annex III, art 22, Basic Conditions of Prospecting, 
Exploration and Exploitation.
91 For example, Nodules Regulations, supra note 88, Reg 30, Annex 4, 
Standard Clauses for Exploration Contract, s 16.
92 SDC Advisory Opinion 2011, supra note 2.
93 Ibid at para 179.
94 Ibid at para 195.
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to the status quo ante.”95 In light of the approaches 
in other agreements discussed above, the reference 
to restoration here is of note. However, a number of 
questions remain unanswered relating to a potential 
liability regime for seabed mining activities in the 
Area, including how “damage to the Area and its 
resources” and “damage to the marine environment” 
might be defined; and how compensable 
damage might be assessed and quantified or 
valued for the purposes of compensation — in 
the words of Annex III, article 22, what is the 
“actual amount of damage” in this context?
Nature and Approach of 
the Liability Regime
As shown above, existing liability agreements 
and processes have taken different approaches 
to what constitutes compensable environmental 
damage. Drawing upon the examples surveyed in 
this paper, approaches to compensation for damage 
to the marine environment might encompass:
 → loss or damage by impairment of the marine 
environment (“loss of profit” claims); 
 → the costs of reasonable measures of 
restoration or reinstatement of the marine 
environment, including natural resources;
 → reasonable measures to introduce the 
equivalent of destroyed or damaged 
components of the marine environment;
 → reasonable costs of assessing and monitoring 
impairment of the marine environment; 
 → the costs of reasonable preventive 
or response measures; and/or
 → other compensatory response measures.
Several examples discussed in this paper relate 
to civil liability regimes, in respect of activities 
that pose risks to the environment, that 
establish rules and procedures for the recovery 
of monetary compensation for losses incurred. 
Other examples focus more on mechanisms 
for preventing and minimizing environmental 
damage, and restoring the environment, as 
95 Ibid at para 197.
well as compensating environmental loss 
that cannot be remediated or restored.96
Nature and Location of 
Potential Impacts 
Deep seabed mining activities will have impacts 
on the marine environment. Such impacts may 
vary in effect and intensity, according to the type 
of mining activity involved, but may include, for 
example, direct habitat destruction, elimination of 
local biodiversity, and degradation of surrounding 
environments through indirect impacts such 
as sediment plumes, noise and vibration from 
pumps, platforms and vessels, and light.97 The 
provisions of the LOSC and the Exploration 
Regulations, as well the SDC Advisory Opinion, 
establish a clear duty on the part of the ISA, 
sponsoring states and contractors to protect the 
marine environment from damage associated 
with activities in the Area. In particular, articles 
139 and 145 underscore this duty on the part of 
the ISA and parties to the convention. Potential 
impacts of mining activities should therefore 
be identified and assessed, and risks addressed, 
before a mining activity is authorized. The 
precautionary approach should also be applied.98
Impacts might occur in and on the seabed 
within the Area, affecting the Area and its 
resources, but could also affect the water column 
above the Area and, in certain circumstances, 
potentially the seabed and water column 
in areas under the national jurisdiction of a 
coastal state. Types of damage may include:
 → damage to persons and property occurring 
as a result of seabed mining activities 
in the Area, including loss arising as 
a result of environmental damage 
caused by seabed mining activities;
96 On these approaches, see Addressing serious harm to the marine 
environment in the regulations for the exploitation of mineral resources in 
the Area, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, ISBA/21/C/13  
(2015). See also, for example, Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Protocol, supra note 
40; Antarctic Environment Protocol, supra note 53, Annex VI, discussed 
above.
97 Daniel C Dunn et al, “A strategy for the conservation of biodiversity on 
mid-ocean ridges from deep-sea mining” (2018) 4:7 Science Advances at 2; 
Lisa A Levin et al, “Defining ‘serious harm’ to the marine environment in the 
context of deep-seabed mining” (2016) 74 Marine Policy 245 at 250–55.
98 SDC Advisory Opinion 2011, supra note 2 at paras 125–35; Draft 
Exploitation Regulations, supra note 89, Draft Regulations 2(5)(b), 14(2), 
46(a).
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 → damage to the marine environment of the Area, 
including damage to living resources of the Area;
 → damage to the Area and its resources 
constituting the CHM;
 → damage to living resources in the water column 
above the Area (i.e., in the high seas);99 and
 → damage to the marine environment and 
natural resources outside the Area (i.e., in 
areas under national jurisdiction).100
The extent to which these and/or other heads of 
damage are compensable will depend, in part, 
on the scope of the regime to be established. 
For example, would the regime only address 
impacts of mining activities on the Area and 
the marine environment of the Area itself, or 
would its scope extend to impacts of deep seabed 
mining activities on the high seas and high seas 
resources and on areas and resources within 
national jurisdiction? While the latter approach 
seems more appropriate and compatible with the 
definition of marine environment contained in 
the Draft Exploitation Regulations (see below), 
how would such a regime relate to other rules and 
instruments applicable in those maritime zones?101
Each of the potential categories of damage 
mentioned above raises complex issues 
of definition, assessment and valuation. 
In its Advisory Opinion, the SDC observed 
that while neither the convention nor the 
relevant Exploration Regulations specify what 
constitutes compensable damage, “[i]t may be 
envisaged that the damage in question would 
include damage to the Area and its resources 
99 For example, depending upon the nature of living resources affected, if such 
damage is covered, it might conceivably include loss of profit from impairment 
to the marine environment, as well as claims relating to damage to the marine 
environment as such, involving assessment of preventive measures, reasonable 
measures of reinstatement, assessment and monitoring, and potentially pure 
environmental damage. If the definition of the marine environment in the 
Draft Exploitation Regulations is adopted and were to be integrated into any 
liability regime, then living resources of the water column above the Area 
would be included within the scope of the rules and procedures on liability.
100 Article 142 of the LOSC addresses the rights and legitimate interests of coastal 
states; for example, Regulation 34 of the Nodules Regulations addresses 
rights of coastal states, including the avoidance of serious harm to the marine 
environment of a coastal state.
101 This would seem to necessitate further consideration in due course of the 
relationship between the deep seabed mining regime established by the ISA 
and any new instrument that may be adopted addressing marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.
constituting the common heritage of mankind, 
and damage to the marine environment.”102  
Damage to the Marine Environment
The Draft Exploitation Regulations define the  
“[m]arine [e]nvironment” as including “the physical, 
chemical, geological and biological and genetic 
components, conditions and factors which interact 
and determine the productivity, state, condition 
and quality and connectivity of the marine 
ecosystem(s), the waters of the seas and oceans 
and the airspace above those waters, as well as the 
seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof.”103 
Given the status of scientific knowledge 
about the marine environment of the Area, 
gaps in baseline data and concerns about the 
potential for irreversible damage, there may 
be significant challenges associated with 
assessing this category of loss. Lisa Levin et 
al. suggest that “[i]n reality, assessing any 
changes to deep-sea ecosystems induced by 
mining activities is challenging at best.”104 They 
suggest the existence of major knowledge gaps 
and the lack of baseline information.105 While 
the definition of marine environment in the 
Exploitation Regulations is designed to capture 
the various components and the complexity of 
the marine ecosystem, that complexity seems 
likely to present significant challenges in terms 
of the assessment and possible restoration or 
reinstatement of components of the environment.
The nature of impacts of seabed mining activities 
on the marine environment may render 
restoration or reinstatement of the environment 
unfeasible.106 As the SDC noted in its Advisory 
Opinion, “the form of reparation will depend 
on both the actual damage and the technical 
feasibility of restoring the situation to the 
status quo ante.”107 As discussed above, there are 
precedents in international law, where restoration 
or reinstatement is not feasible, to make provision 
102 SDC Advisory Opinion 2011, supra note 2 at para 179.
103 Draft Exploitation Regulations, supra note 89, Schedule 1, Use of Terms and 
Scope.
104 Levin et al, supra note 97 at 248.
105 Ibid at 248–49.
106 See e.g. Cindy Lee Van Dover et al, “Biodiversity Loss from Deep-Sea Mining” 
(2017) 10:7 Nature Geoscience 464–65.
107 SDC Advisory Opinion 2011, supra note 2 at para 197.
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in a liability regime for introduction of equivalent 
components of biodiversity at the same or an 
alternative location. However, it may be that 
this approach is not possible or may not fully 
offset damage to the marine environment in 
the Area. The identification and “threshold” of 
cumulative impacts on the marine environment 
may also need to be considered and may be 
particularly challenging to identify and address.
Where adequate measures of reinstatement 
or restoration or introduction of equivalents 
cannot be put in place, consideration should be 
given to other ways of compensating damage 
to the marine environment, in particular 
given the status of the Area as the CHM.
Damage to the Area and Its Resources 
Constituting the CHM 
The statement of the SDC that “[i]t may be 
envisaged that the damage in question would 
include damage to the Area and its resources 
constituting the common heritage of mankind, 
and damage to the marine environment” suggests 
that these can be treated as separate categories 
of damage. In some respects, however, it may be 
difficult to separate them. Damage to or depletion 
of natural resources may be viewed as a distinct 
head of damage under a liability regime, as, for 
example, in the work of the UNCC discussed 
above. In that sense, if mineral resources are lost 
or damaged as a result of activities in the Area, 
it may be possible to ascribe economic value to 
them on the basis of some form of commercial 
valuation. At the same time, the Area and its 
mineral resources constitute part of the marine 
environment of the Area, at least under the terms 
of the definition contained in the Draft Exploitation 
Regulations (see above). In that sense, damage 
to the resources of the Area also implies damage 
to a component of the seabed environment. 
Even as a separate category of damage, the status 
of the Area and its resources as the CHM raises 
challenges for defining and valuing compensable 
damage. Damage to the CHM may imply the 
need to consider not only the economic value 
of lost or damaged resources but other values 
associated with its designation as the CHM. 
Genetic Resources
In keeping with contemporary understandings of 
biodiversity, the definition of marine environment 
in the Draft Exploitation Regulations includes a 
reference to genetic components of the marine 
ecosystem. The legal status of genetic resources 
in the Area is not settled and may be subject to 
further discussion in 2019 and beyond in the 
context of the negotiation of an international 
legally binding instrument on the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction.108 For the 
purposes of defining categories of environmental 
damage, marine genetic resources might be viewed 
as components of the marine environment and/
or as natural resources of actual or potential 
commercial value. The implications of the 
ongoing negotiations on marine biodiversity of 
the Area for any liability regime for activities in 
the Area will need to be kept under review.
Threshold of Harm
Article 162 provides that areas should be 
disapproved for exploitation where there 
is substantial evidence of a risk of “serious 
harm” to the marine environment. Emergency 
orders may also be issued, including for 
suspension or adjustment of operations 
and for other response measures to prevent 
serious harm to the marine environment.109  
On this basis, should serious harm be the threshold 
at which liability for compensable damage to the 
marine environment would arise? As compared 
to other areas of international law, and in 
particular, in light of developments in international 
environmental law since the adoption of the LOSC 
in 1982, prima facie the use of the term serious 
harm seems to impose an unreasonably high 
threshold before liability for harm is triggered. 
The August 2018 Draft Exploitation Regulations 
define serious harm as “any effect from activities 
in the Area on the Marine Environment which 
represents a significant adverse change in the 
Marine Environment determined according to 
the rules, regulations and procedures adopted 
by the Authority on the basis of internationally 
recognized standards and practices informed 
108 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on  
24 December 2017, UNGAOR, 72nd Sess, A/RES/72/249 (2017). 
109 LOSC, supra note 1, art 162(2)(w); see e.g. Nodules Regulations, supra note 
88, art 33. 
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by Best Available Scientific Evidence.”110 
“Environmental [e]ffects” are defined as “any 
consequences in the Marine Environment arising 
from the conduct of Exploitation activities, being 
positive, negative, direct, indirect, temporary or 
permanent, or cumulative effect arising over time 
or in combination with other mining impacts.”111 
The implication of these definitions for any liability 
regime, and their linkage with it, requires further 
consideration. The definition appears to imply 
that ways of determining “significant adverse 
change” would be adopted by the ISA, and it may 
be appropriate to develop criteria or guidance for 
assessing the existence, nature and scale of such 
change, taking into account the precautionary 
approach. Levin et al. have examined the definition 
of serious harm and sought to identify key 
parameters to inform decisions about whether 
an impact constitutes a serious harm. They 
consider, inter alia, the definition of “significant 
adverse impact” adopted under the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) international guidelines on deep-sea bottom 
fishing,112 and in the seabed mining context, suggest 
also taking into account the cumulative effects 
of impacts, the probability of impacts occurring 
and scientific uncertainty.113 Work under other 
agreements, such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, may also be relevant in this context.    
Conclusion
If the ISA decides to develop more specific rules 
and procedures on liability for damage to the Area 
and its resources, including damage to the marine 
environment, there are numerous examples of 
liability regimes in other areas of international law 
that might provide useful models or examples for 
consideration and/or adaptation. It is important 
110 Draft Exploitation Regulations, supra note 89, Schedule 1, Use of Terms and 
Scope.
111 Ibid.
112 FAO, International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-sea Fisheries 
in the High Seas (Rome: FAO, 2009), online: <www.fao.org/in-action/
vulnerable-marine-ecosystems/background/deep-sea-guidelines/en/>. The 
guidelines aim to ensure conservation and sustainable use of marine living 
resources in the deep seas and to prevent significant adverse impacts on 
vulnerable marine ecosystems. 
113 Levin et al, supra note 97 at 248.
to note, however, that, with the exception of the 
oil pollution regime, practical experience in the 
application of the numerous civil liability regimes is 
limited, often because the regimes have not entered 
into force. The instruments and processes surveyed 
above do not reflect a fully harmonized approach to 
questions of definition of environmental damage. 
However, they illustrate a growing acceptance that 
environmental damage should be compensated, 
even in circumstances where the assessment and 
quantification of such damage is challenging and, 
increasingly, that compensation or compensatory 
measures should be available where restoration 
of the damaged environment is not feasible or 
where measures taken to restore the damaged 
environment nonetheless result in interim loss. The 
wider context of both international environmental 
law and the relevant provisions of the LOSC place 
the emphasis on the prevention of environmental 
harm and, in particular in light of the SDC Advisory 
Opinion, on the precautionary approach. 
The characteristics and legal character of the Area 
mean that a tailored approach will be required that 
takes into account the existing legal framework 
under Parts XI and XII of the LOSC and the 
guidance of the SDC in its Advisory Opinion. At a 
minimum, the definition of compensable damage 
in any such regime needs to accommodate the 
particular features of the marine environment 
of the Area and the status of the Area and its 
resources as part of the CHM. The definition also 
needs to take into account the state of scientific 
knowledge in relation to deep sea ecosystems. 
Particular issues to be considered may include:
 → the relation with existing provisions and 
guidance relating to protection of the 
marine environment and liability under the 
provisions of the convention, the Mining 
Code and the SDC Advisory Opinion;
 → the need to ensure protection of the 
marine environment from harmful effects 
that may arise from activities in the Area, 
reflecting the precautionary approach;
 → potential difficulties associated with 
implementing existing approaches to restoration 
and introduction of equivalents in the context 
of the marine environment of the deep seabed, 
including, for example, the state of scientific 
knowledge and scientific uncertainty, the 
accessibility of deep seabed ecosystems and 
the potential for irreparable harm; and
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 → the need for monitoring and assessment of 
damage to the marine environment, including 
cumulative and long-term impacts.
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